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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the Presidency of the European Commission as a political leadership position.  It 
does so on three levels.  First, it considers the relational nature of leadership, arguing that every 
leadership position is shaped by its 'relationship network' - the relationships of the leader with his 
constituents, co-actors, and subordinates.  Second, it develops a typology of leadership styles, that 
Commission Presidents might exercise within the limits of the Commission Presidency's highly 
constraining relationship network. The three main types (neo-functionalist, federalist and 
intergovernmentalist) integrate integration theory literature with existing knowledge of the activities of 
Commission Presidents.  Third, these ideas, and a personality-assessment-at-a-distance technique, are 
employed in a case-study of Jacques Delors.  The study shows that Delors' leadership cannot be 
understood in simple Euro-federalist terms.  It also shows the ability of the concepts and methods used 
to advance comparative study of the Commission Presidency.  
 
Introduction 
 
Political leadership is both a subject of widespread fascination and a poorly understood phenomonen.  
In this respect, studies of the European Union (EU) are no exception.  With recent advances in 
European integration, greater attention has been given to the role of the President of the European 
Commission, and the potential importance of the Commission Presidency to the Union.1  Yet the 
leadership of Commission Presidents remains little understood, and rarely studied outside the specific 
context of the Presidency of Jacques Delors.  The end of the Delors Presidency provides an appropriate 
moment to 'step back' and consider the leadership of Commission Presidents.   
This paper contributes to the study of the Commission Presidency by addressing the essential concepts 
which such study must be based upon.  It does so in three sections.  The first focuses on political 
leadership as a general phenomonen.  I note that political leadership is inherently 'relational': that the 
notion of leadership cannot make sense outside of a relationship between 'leader' and 'led'.  This is 
important not only for our basic understanding of leadership, but because it has implications for 
comparative assessment of leadership positions.  'Leader-led' interactions can be disaggregated into 
three distinct relationships, which together form a 'relationship network'.  The particular status of the 
Commission Presidency's 'relationship network' is contrasted to those of other leadership positions, to 
help us understand the leadership potential, and the constraints, of the Commission Presidency. 
Next, I construct a typology of leadership styles that Commission Presidents might exercise within 
these general constraints.  The three types developed (Neo-Functionalist, Federalist and Intergovernmentalist) draw on existing integration theory literature to indicate plausible alternative 
paths for Commission Presidency leadership. 
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The third section applies the typology, using a psychological Assessment-at-a-Distance technique, to a 
case-study of Jacques Delors.  The study shows that Delors' leadership cannot be understood in simple 
'Euro-Federalist' terms: more subtle characterizations must be employed.  I conclude by arguing that 
the approach advocated here will not only help us better understand the impact of Delors, but also form 
a sounder basis for comparative studies - between different Commission Presidents, and between the 
leadership of Commission Presidents and that of other political leadership positions.  
 
 
 
Section One: Conceptualizing the Commision Presidency as a Leadership Role. 
 
Leadership as a Relational Phenomenon 
  
The literature on political leadership is considerable - on 'leadership' more broadly defined, truly vast.  
Yet it is a literature more notable for disagreement and lack of progress than almost anything else - 
evidenced by the fact that some authors still debate basic 'framework construction' for leadership 
study.2  Inasmuch as there is agreement on anything in the literature, however, it is that leadership is a 
'relational phenomonen'.3  Put simply, this involves the notion that one cannot discuss 'leadership' 
outside of its relationship with those who are 'led': "Leadership and Followership are linked concepts, 
neither of which can be understood without understanding the other".4  Any leadership study, therefore, 
begins with the simple question of "who is leading whom from where to where".5   
The idea of leadership as relational has generally been used to downplay the possibility of making 
general statements about leadership, and to explain the inability of scholars to find leadership attributes 
that apply across a multitude of settings.6  'Relational' leadership suggests that it is the context of the 
specific situation, and most particularly the needs of the led, that determine what type of leadership 
attributes are effective.  This implies a need to move directly into empirical investigation of the context 
of leadership, to answer the 'who', 'who', 'where' and 'where' questions.7 
  While accepting the basic notion of leadership as relational, I contend that this insight has been 
insufficiently exploited for the study of political leadership.  This is because the simple 'leader-led' 
categorization has been retained in studies of leadership.8  This prevents us from understanding that 
there are three distinct political roles that are played by those classified together as 'led': those of 
'constituent', 'subordinate', and 'co-actor'; and that, consequently, three different relationships exist with 
leaders.9  I argue that the status of a leadership position on these three relationships allows us to 
explain a substantial amount about the potential and constraints of that position. 
  Leader-constituent relations involve the leader in interaction with those who are responsible for 
the leader continuing to occupy the leadership position.  While the constituent role may be virtually 
defunct in absolute dictatorships, in the long-run there are few, if any, political leaders who can feel 
absolutely secure from the need to satisfy some constituency of support, even if such a group is rather 
narrowly drawn.  Leader-Co-actor relations involve the leader and those others who must be involved 
for the collectivity to actually get anything done.10  While co-actors may vary from issue to issue, 
there are also likely to be generally significant co-actors for any leadership position.  Leader-
subordinate relations involve the leader and those whom the leader is generally able to compel (rather 
than have to persuade) to do things.11   
     The fact that these three roles have traditionally been conflated into a single 'leader-led' category 
appears largely due to much leadership research originating in social psychological study of small 
groups (such as gangs)12, where the three roles are generally performed by the same people - the 
constituents are also the co-actors and subordinates.  Disaggregating the leader-led relationship into the 
three discussed here is important, however, for what it can tell us about a political leadership position. 
  To understand this, we must consider three questions, one relating to each of the three 
relationships.  The first of these refers to the scope of the leader-subordinate relationship.  Are the 
leader's subordinates also significant co-actors?  Other things being equal, a leader who possesses at least some ability to compel (or ability to replace in the absence of compliance) a substantial 
proportion of those whom they need to take action, should be able to exercise more decisive 
leadership13 than a leader whose subordinates only form a insignificant part of those needed as co-
actors.  Put simply, I assume that compulsion is easier than persuasion. 
  The second question refers to the scope of the leader-constituent relationship.  Is there a 
substantial overlap between constituents and co-actors?  A greater overlap suggests that the leader will 
need to exercise greater caution, and be more sensitive to the views of constituents when exercising 
leadership: for fear that the constituents may seek the removal of the leader.14   
  The third question refers to the scope of the leader:co-actor relationship.  Does the leader need to 
mobilise many co-actors to actually get anything done?  The greater the number of seperate actors that 
must be involved to achieve anything, the more difficult it should be for leadership to be exercised.   
  Together, the three relationships form what I term a 'relationship network': the collection of 
relationships within which the holder of a leadership position must operate.  The answers to the three 
questions above determine the sort of relationship network that an office-holder is placed within. If, for 
example, the leader has few subordinates who are important co-actors, a high degree of constituent co-
actor overlap, and must work through many necessary co-actors, then they are clearly operating in a 
highly constraining leadership position - with obvious implications for the degree of leadership they 
are able to exert.  
 
The Commission Presidency as a Relationship Network 
 
I shall now apply the relationship network idea to the Commission Presidency.  The primary 
constituency for the Commission Presidency is the governments of the member states - who must 
agree unanimously on the appointment of the President, have the potential (though as yet unrealised), 
to replace him halfway through his term and whose unanimous approval will again be required if the 
President seeks re-appointment.15  The European Parliament has, of course, increased in importance as 
a secondary constituency as a result of the Maastricht Treaty - gaining the right to approve the person 
nominated as President by the national governments (and the new Commission as a whole), and 
retaining the ability to dismiss the entire Commission.16   
The Commission President's list of co-actors includes virtually all the major interests within the EU - 
his Commission colleagues, other elements of the 'Brussels bureacracy' (his own staff to a limited 
degree, but also COREPER, and the Council Secretariat), the Parliament and, of course the national 
governments.  The Commission Presidents' subordinates, however, are considerably fewer in number: 
they comprise principally his own staff, led by the Cabinet.17 
The implications of the relationhip network which the Commission President finds himself within are 
set out in table 1.  Here, I compare the Commission Presidency to two rather contrasting political 
leadership positions (The United States Presidency and the British Prime Ministership) in relation to 
the three questions detailed earlier:   
 
 TABLE  1 
   ³British Prime Minister  ³U.S. President  ³Commission 
  ³ ³ ³President 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
1. Subordinate/ Co-  ³Very Often - Co-Actors  ³Often - Can include Cabinet,  ³Rarely - few 
Actor Overlap?  ³include Cabinet  ³personal staff and bureaucrats  ³subordinates. Most 
 ³Ministers,  personal  staff  ³(subordinates), but may also ³co-actors  not 
  ³and bureaucracy (all  ³include other political figures  ³subordinates. 
  ³subordinates).  ³with own power base (eg. ³ 
 ³  ³Congresssional  leaders).  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
2. Constituent/ Co-  ³Moderate18 - exists  ³Low - Main constituency ³Quite High - Main 
Actor Overlap?  ³somewhat among M.Ps,  ³(public) has little co-actor ³elements of 
  ³but not other main  ³capability.  ³constituency 
  ³constituency - public.  ³  ³(National gov. and   ³ ³ ³EP)  both  important 
  ³ ³ ³co-actors. 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
3. Many Necessary  ³Not usually - policy  ³Sometimes (Varies by policy  ³Usually. 
Co-Actors?  ³control quite centralized.  ³area - more so in Domestic  ³ 
  ³  ³policy than Foreign).  ³ 
 
As can be seen, the basic relationship network of the Commission President is a constraining one - 
particularly when compared to the other two leadership positions.  This helps us to understand why - 
compared with other leadership positions - effective leadership in the office is so difficult, and why 
(despite the considerable qualities of many of the incumbents) effective Commission Presidency 
leadership has been so rare.   
However, some means by which a Commission President can overcome or seek to improve on the 
constraints of his position are also suggested.  Firstly, he can try to increase the level of subordinate-
co-actor overlap, by bringing policies under his personal control.  Jacques Delors was able to do this, 
to a limited extent, on the issue of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the late 1980s:19  
resulting in his being able to exert considerable influence upon the direction of the EMU debate, and 
over the final outcome as reflected in the Maastricht Treaty.20.    Second, the constraints of 
constituent-co-actor overlap could be diminished by a Commission President either making clear an 
indifference to the renewal of his term of office; or by winning powerful backers among the national 
governments, so that those less happy face a major dispute if they seek to replace the incumbent 
President.  Delors seems to have practiced the second tactic to some effect, by winning the strong 
support of Chancellor Kohl.21  However, a third possibility - limiting the number of significant co-
actors - is probably not feasible for any Commision President.  Delors seems not to have tried this 
option: indeed, in helping the European Parliament win 'co-decision' powers on much legislation in the 
Maastricht Treaty, he helped add to the number of relevant actors (albeit, adding another generally pro-
integration one). 
In summary, the Commission Presidency, like all political leadership positions, is involved in a 
network of relationships that do much to define the leadership potential of the position.  The 
relationship network of Commission Presidents is a highly constraining one: nonetheless, there is some 
room for manoeuver, as demonstrated by Jacques Delors. 
 
Section Two: A typology of Commission Presidency leadership   
 
Thinking in terms of a relationship network tells us much about the process of leadership: specifically, 
the ability of an incumbent to be able to exercise leadership.  But the major weakness of such an 
approach is that, by itself, it tells us little about the direction, or focus of leadership - the content of 
what a leader is seeking to achieve.  This section will describe a typology of Commission Presidency 
leadership which addresses this deficiency.    
The basis for the typology is the existing normative and descriptive theoretical perspectives on 
European integration - neo-functionalism, federalism and intergovernmentalism.22  In constructing the 
typology, these perspectives have been connected to existing knowledge regarding the main activities 
of Commission Presidents.  Using existing integration theories as a starting point has at least two 
advantages.  First, it allows one to develop analysis of the Commission Presidency that uses insights 
and suggestions already generated, rather than having to construct a framework entirely from the 
'ground up'.  Second, there is sufficient contrast between the three perspectives to allow for three types 
with rather different behavior patterns.  
The aim of this typology is to set out plausible alternative paths that Commission Presidency 
leadership can take, and against which the actions of specific Commission Presidents can be compared.  
The point of constructing these leadership 'types' for Commission Presidents is not to engage in debate 
on the explanatory power of (for example) neo-functionalism, or (even less), the desirability of any 
particular route to integration.  Nor is any Commission President expected to conform exactly to any 
one of these three 'ideals'.  More simply, the aim should be to see, in any particular instance, whether 
and to what degree there are elements of neo-functionalist, federalist, and intergovernmentalist 
strategies in the actual leadership styles of Commission Presidents. Existing literature suggests a number of leadership activities that Commission Presidents engage in.  
These include activities that are basically internal to the Commission - the personal control of 
particular policy areas and administrative sections, and the coordination of the Commissions activities 
and policy programme23; more external leadership includes representing the Commission in European 
Council meetings (and elsewhere), acting as a policy advocate with National governments, and as a 
facilitator of intergovernmental bargains.24  
Neo-functionalists aim to further integration by encouraging progress on specific functional matters, 
and, through the process of 'linkage', generate a 'spillover' of cooperation, rather than confronting the 
integration issue with a more direct appeal to governments and publics.  An ideal-typical neo-
functionalist Commission President could be expected to concentrate less on open calls for integration 
to be advanced, and rather to focus on the technical policy issues of advancing integration, while 
downplaying the degree to which this was linked to long-term strategy.  This suggests a high 
concentration on internal leadership activities, and a rather low-key strategy of external leadership.  
The federalist vision is much more about a 'Great Leap Forward' approach.  A federalist Commission 
President could be expected to be much less concerned with technical details than with the broad 
picture - to concentrate activity mainly on governments and peoples, and the construction of European-
level political institutions.  This suggests a high-profile external leadership, but little attention to 
internal leadership.  By some contrast, the intergovernmentalist vision sees European integration as 
best kept to the level of promoting cooperation between nation-states that must remain the most 
powerful actors.  The ideal-type intergovernmentalist Commission President would focus on technical 
details only insofar as they impinged upon cooperative arrangements, and be concerned not with 'Great 
Leaps Forward' in integration, but rather with maintaining some harmony between differing national 
interests.  This suggests concentration on external leadership, but in a rather more low-key manner 
than for the federalist type.25 
    
 
Section Three: Assessing Jacques Delors 
 
This section applies the typology developed above in a case-study of Jacques Delors.  The study 
employs a psychological personality-assessment-at-a-distance technique for analysing Delors.  The 
study aims to do two things: first, to advance our understanding of Delors himself; and second, to 
enhance our capacities for the comparative assessment of political leadership in general, and 
Commission Presidents in particular. 
The analysis of political leadership is an even more daunting task than its conceptualization.26  The 
task is particularly difficult if we seek to explain, (rather than simply note the existence of), leadership, 
and if we seek to make valid comparisons across a number of different leaders.  Most methods 
currently employed fall short on one or both of these criteria. 
'Reputational' assessment has a long history in studies of power 27, and is used (at least implicitly) in 
our evaluations of leaders: eg. 'we know Jacques Delors is important because everyone says that he 
is'.28  Another, often similarly implicit, method is 'outcomes analysis': eg. 'we know that Jacques 
Delors is an effective leader because of his achievements...'.29  Neither of these methods, however, 
pass our first criterion.  That is, they both offer highly useful evidence of the existence of effective 
leadership - particularly valued given the paucity of knowledge available about the inner politics of the 
EU.  But they can do little to explain why leadership has been effective. 
More promising, from this viewpoint, are participant-observer studies,30 and (to a somewhat lesser 
extent, given their often self-serving nature) memoir accounts by political insiders.  These can often be 
extremely informative about both the style and substance of leadership behavior in specific cases.31  
But by their very nature, such studies tend to be highly particularistic: thus making it very difficult to 
use them as the basis for any systematic comparisons. 
This is where techniques like the at-a-distance one employed here have an advantage.  They allow for 
systematic comparison, as they can feasibly be applied to all leaders and leadership positions.32  They 
also allow for a genuine advance in our understanding and explanation of leadership, by giving insight 
into a core element in an individual's leadership abilities - their personality. 
The purpose behind psychological studies of leadership personality has been most clearly articulated 
by Fred Greenstein.33  He notes that individual leadership is clearly an important explanatory factor 
for political outcomes in many settings.  To the degree that we believe there to have been high 'actor indispensibility' (the outcome would not have been the same in the absence of the leader) in any 
situation, then it is important for scholars to discover what it was about the leader, in the relational 
context that they were operating in, that was behind their influence (for good or bad) on the outcome. 
Once we begin investigating the personal qualities behind leadership success, we clearly enter the 
realm of the psychological.  This has long been considered one of the most difficult areas of 
investigation for students of politics, particularly given our inability to subject leaders to detailed 
clinical investigations.34  In recent years, however, there has been considerable advance in at-a-
distance techniques of assessment.  These methods use unobtrusive measures of politically-relevant 
psychological characteristics, and have been demonstrated to have considerable validity and insight.35  
This section presents a study of Delors using an adapted version of the Hermann method for 
personality assessment at-a-distance.36  This method uses as its data source the responses given by 
leaders in interviews,37 which are examined for evidence of 8 personality traits which should be 
important to the behavior of political leaders: Nationalism (here defined as 'Euro-Federalism', or an 
attachment to the advance of integration; Belief in One's Ability to Control Events; Need for Power; 
Need for Affiliation (defined as "a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm and 
friendly relations with other persons or groups")38; Conceptual Complexity; Self-Confidence; Distrust 
of Others; and Task Orientation (that is, "a relative emphasis in interactions with others in getting the 
task done as opposed to focusing on the feelings and needs of others").39  The method yields 
numerical scores for each trait.  In analyzing the interview material, interest is less in the surface 
content of the material (except insofar as we must be aware of the context within which the leader is 
speaking), than in attempting to analyze  the motives that lie behind this speech.  
Table 2 shows how we can connect the 8 traits to the typology constructed in the previous section.  
While there may be some dispute about individual cells, the table matches up the types of leadership to 
the characteristics fairly well.   
 
 
TABLE 2: Connections between Commission Presidents 
by type, and adapted Hermann methodology 
 Not  Available 
 
 
Thus, the technically-minded neo-functionalist type scores highly on conceptual complexity, where the 
federalist type - likely to gloss over finer details in favour of broad, sweeping appeals for European 
unity - scores much lower.  A federalist scores highly on Nationalism/Euro-federalism, while an 
Intergovernmentalist scores highly on Affiliation need - reflecting their desire to encourage 
intergovernmental harmony in cooperation. 
Table 3 reports scores for Delors on the eight characteristics, as well as standardized scores that allow 
for comparisons with two groups of other political leaders.  The first column reports percentage scores, 
that are generally in agreement with what other accounts would lead one to expect of Delors: the 
importance of Euro-federalism, evidence of his being a complex thinker, and being highly motivated to 
achieve set tasks.  This is encouraging, in providing yet further support for the validity of the techique.  
The second and third columns of the table demonstrate interesting scores for Delors when compared to 
people in other leadership settings.  Relative to these other leaders (all heads of national governments), 
Delors shows a low ability to control events, and low self-confidence, a high need for power, and 
affiliation motive.  This chimes well with the discussion of the first section, regarding the impact of the 
relationship network which a Commission President is placed within: compared to national leaders, the 
incumbent Commission President is placed in a highly constraining leadership position, from which it 
would be no surprise if they were left feeling rather impotent.  They will likely desire greater power, to 
overcome this status, yet must continually bear in mind the need to maintain good relations with their 
numerous co-actors in order to actually achieve anything.   
Also of interest are Delors' high level of distrust - which could be a peculiarity of Delors, or another 
outcome of the difficult position of the Commission President - and his astonishingly high score on the 
Nationalism/Euro-Federalism characteristic.  This latter score suggests that Delors' appeals for 
European unity were far more open than the level of nationalism which other leaders generally allow 
themselves to exhibit. Considering both the percentage and standardized scores in relation to the typology outlined in section 
2, Delors exhibits traits consistent with a Federalist-type Commission President for the 
Nationalism/Euro-Federalism and Need for Power characteristics, but he is more consistent with the 
Intergovernmental ideal on Need for Affiliation, ability to control events, distrust of others, and self-
confidence, and with the Neo-Funtionalist type on conceptual complexity and task orientation. 
 TABLE  3 
 
Personal Characteristics  ³Overall Score 40 ³Comparison with 53  ³Comparison with 8 West 
  ³  ³World Leaders 41  ³European Leaders 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Nationalism/Euro-Federalism ³50.5% ³86.5  (.10)  ³148.8  (.04) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Ability to Control Events  ³38.8%  ³38.8 (.18)  ³39.4 (.18) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Need for Power  ³48.2%  ³75.6 (.11)  ³70.9 (.13) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Need for Affiliation  ³25.4%  ³76.3 (.07)  ³62.8 (.12) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Conceptual Complexity  ³48.3%  ³59.4 (.12)  ³64.1 (.08) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Self-Confidence  ³37.4%  ³14.6 (.15)  ³23.8 (.17) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Distrust of Others  ³31.6%  ³61.1 (.14)  ³83.7 (.07) 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Task orientation  ³57.3%  ³44.9 (.13)  ³42.3 (.10) 
(N=51).42 
In other words, the pattern is clearly a mixture of the traits of different ideals of Commission 
Presidency leadership.  The results suggest that while Delors certainly had federalist ambitions for the 
EU, there were also distinct elements of neo-functionalism in his methods, while the constraints of the 
Commission Presidency ensured that he, like any incumbent, had to remain sensitive to 
intergovernmental considerations, despite not sharing the ultimate goals of the intergovernmentalist 
vision. 
Table 4 shows further interesting results for Delors, where scores have been reported for interview 
responses along different issue-areas.  The table confirms Delors' confidence on technical matters of 
policy, and shows him to be notably context-sensitive, being far more likely to strike a Euro-federalist 
tone when discussing broader issues.   
  TABLE 4: By Subject 43 
Personal Characteristic  ³(N=23) Pool 1  ³(N=10) Pool 2  ³(N=18) Pool 3 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Nationalism/Euro-  ³52.5% ³43.8% ³51.3% 
Federalism  ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Ability to Control  ³37.0%  ³55.7%  ³32.1% 
Events  ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Need for Power  ³48.6%  ³57.9%  ³42.1% 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Need for Affiliation  ³21.8%  ³32.9%  ³25.2% 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Conceptual  Complexity  ³46.7% ³53.6% ³47.4% 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Self-Confidence  ³41.3% ³60.0% ³26.4% 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Distrust  of  Others  ³28.6% ³31.3% ³34.6% 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Task  Orientation  ³62.3% ³65.9% ³45.6% 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Delors' more high-profile stance on European unity only emerged 
from the late 1980s, when the success of Delors' early, more technical initiatives raised the broader 
matters of monetary and political union. 
Assessment-at-a-distance methods open up new and exciting opportunities for the study of the 
Commission Presidency.  This is not to claim that they represent a 'magic key', unlocking hitherto 
entirely undiscovered insights into the personalities of public figures.  As good, if not better isights into 
a leader may be gained from a prolonged close period of observation.  Nonetheless, the technique 
reported here does allow for insight into those aspects of a leader's personality believed to have an 
influence on leadership behavior.  Delors  has been found to exhibit characteristics clearly beyond 
those of an ideal-type federalist Commission President.  In fact, although demonstrating federalist 
goals, the results suggest his mode of operation as being more closely related to the neo-functionalist 
and intergovernmentalist types.   
Where these methods are particularly useful in that they can be applied to all leaders on an equal basis, 
thus facilitating the systematic comparison of leader'spersonalities and their impact on leadership 
behavior.44 
    
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the Commission Presidency at 3 levels - as a leadership position compared to 
others; in terms of alternative types of leadership within that position; and in an individual analysis of 
Delors.  I contend that if the impact of a leader like Delors is to be explained, then we must be able to 
understand the Commission Presidency at all three levels.  A full explanation must attempt to 
incorporate the relational constraints that a leader operates within, the broad strategies available to 
them, and the importance of their personal characteristics.  To this end, the paper has attempted to 
advance our thinking on all 3 fronts.  It has laid out the implications for the Commission Presidency of 
its' 'relational network'; indicated how integration theories may be interpreted as alternative 
Commission Presidency leadership styles; and have also demonstated the usefulness of a personality 
assessment-at-a-distance technique.  Thus, it has attended to both the conceptual and methodological 
tools necessary for developing comparative analysis of Commission Presidents.   
The need now is for further work utilizing these tools, to help us more fully understand the 
Commission Presidency, by speaking to the following questions: Is there a best, or most effective, style 
of Commission Presidency leadership?  Why has Delors apparently been so much more successful than 
almost all his predecessors?  Are there systematic differences in the leadership of Commission 
Presidents to that of leaders in other types of setting?  It is towards answering these questions, and 
ultimately a more systematic understanding of the Commission Presidency, that this paper has sought 
to contribute. 
 
 
References Artis, M.J.  1992.  "The Maastricht Road to Monetary Union"  Journal of Common Market Studies  
30:299-309. 
 
Burns, James M.  1978.  Leadership.  New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Cole, Alistair.  1994.  "Studying Political Leadership: the case of Francois Mitterand."  Political 
Studies  42:453-468. 
 
Dinan, Desmond.  1993.  Historical Dictionary of the European Community  London:Scarecrow Press. 
 
Drake, Helen.  1995.  "Political Leadership and European Integration: The Case of Jacques Delors"  
West European Politics  18:140-160. 
 
Gibb, Cecil A.  1968.  "Leadership"  Chapter 31 in  The Handbook of Social Psychology (second 
edition) edited by Gardner Lindsay & Elliot Aronson,  London:Addison Wesley. 
 
Greenstein, Fred I.  1987.  Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and 
Conceptualization  Princeton, N.J:Princeton University Press. 
 
Heller, Trudy,  Jon Van Til,  and Louis A. Zurcher. (editors)  1986.  Leaders and Followers: 
Challenges for the Future  Greenwich, Ct.:Jai Press. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G.  1983.  "Assessing Personality at a Distance: A profile of Ronald Reagan"  
Mershon Center Quarterly Report  7:1-8. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G.  1987.  Handbook for Assessing Personality Characteristics and Foreign Policy 
Orientations of Political Leaders  (unpublished). 
  
Jones, Bryan. (editor).  1989.  Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in Political Science  
Lawrence. Kansas:University of Kansas Press. 
 
Lodge, Juliet.  1993.  "E.C. policymaking: Institutional dynamics"  Chapter 1 in  The European 
Community and the Challenge of the Future  edited by Juliet Lodge.  New York:St.Martins Press. 
 
Moravscik, Andrew.  1990.  "Negotiating the Single Act: National Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft in the European Community"  Harvard Working Paper Series, 21. 
 
Moravscik, Andrew.  1993.  "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach"  Journal of Common Market Studies  31:473-524.  
 
Nugent, Neill.  1994.  The Government and Politics of the European Union (third edition)  
Durham:Duke University Press. 
 
Ross, George.  1995.  Jacques Delors and European Integration  New York:Oxford University Press. 
 
Seligman, Lester G.  1950.  "The Study of Political Leadership"   American Political Science Review  
44:904-915. 
 
Winter, David G.  1990.  "Measuring Personality at a Distance: Development of an Integrated System 
for Scoring Motives in Running Text"  (unpublished manuscript). 
 